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In thewake ofthe bacterial revolution after Robert Koch identified the tuberculosisbacillus,
medical and public health professionals classified the various forms of consumption and
phthisis as a single disease-tuberculosis. In large measure, historians have adopted that
perspective. While there isundoubtedly a great deal oftruth in thisconceptualization, we argue
that it obscures almost as much as it illuminates. By collapsing the nineteenth-century terms
phthisis andconsumption into tuberculosis, we maintain that historians have not understood the
effect of non-bacterial consumption on working-class populations who suffered from the
symptoms ofcoughing, wasting away, and losingweight.
In this essay, we explore how, in the nineteenth century, what we now recognize as silicosis
was referred to as miners' "con," stonecutters' phthisis, and other industry-specific forms of
phthisis and consumption. We examine how the later and narrowerview ofthebacterial origins
of tuberculosis limited the medical professions' ability to diagnose and understand diseases
caused by industrial dust. This paper explores the contention that developed at the turn of the
century over occupational lung disease and tuberculosis and the circumstances that led to the
unmasking ofsilicosis as a disease category.
In recent years, historians have examined the enormous effect that tuberculosis
has had on American society. They have described how, in the mid-nineteenth
century, the disease was romanticized in Victorian novels and was understood to
affect middle- as well as working-class populations. By the early twentieth century,
the disease was associated in the popular imagination with poverty and crowded
working and living conditions. Historians have also identified tuberculosis as a
disease associated with the workplace. They have detailed how overworked, under-
paid workers toiled in harsh, dark, and crowded workplaces and were thus suscepti-
ble to infection by a bacillus that prospered under insanitary conditions. Throughout
most ofthe nineteenth century, workers and physicians referred to the constellation
of symptoms associated with the disease as phthisis or consumption. In the wake of
the bacterial revolution after Robert Koch identified the tuberculosis bacillus, the
medical profession and public health professionals identified the various forms of
consumption as a single disease-tuberculosis. In large measure, historians have
adopted that perspective. While there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this
conceptualization, we argue that it obscures almost as much as it illuminates. By
collapsing phthisis and consumption into tuberculosis, historians have distorted the
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nineteenth-century meaning of the terms consumption andphthisis. As a result, we
have not understood their effect on the varied populations who suffered from the
symptoms of coughing, wasting away, and losing weight. In addition, we have
shrouded the relationship between silicosis, an acknowledged industrial disease, and
tuberculosis.
In this essay, we explore how, in the nineteenth century, whatwe now recognize as
silicosis was referred to as miners' "con," stonecutters' phthisis, and other industry-
specific forms ofphthisis and consumption. We examine how the later and narrower
view ofthe bacterial origins oftuberculosis limited the medical professions' ability to
diagnose and understand diseases causedbyindustrial dust. This paper also explores
the contention that developed at the turn of the century over occupational lung
disease and tuberculosis and the circumstances that led to the unmasking ofsilicosis
as a disease category [1].
Early in the twentieth century, officials of the Granite Cutters' Union in Barre,
Vermont, complained that consumption, "the white man's scourge," was "claiming
almost every granite cutter in this vicinity, before he reaches the age offifty." It was
obvious to the union that the cause of the epidemic was the granite dust inhaled
while carving, chipping, and finishing monuments, gravestones, andbuildingfacades.
The local physicians agreed that the workers were suffering from consumption, but
they differed in their understanding of its cause. The profession assumed that the
workers' consumptionwas caused bytinygerms that spread among thework force as
a result ofpoorpersonal hygiene and unsanitary living conditions.
The physicians had begun to refer to consumption as tuberculosis. The union and
the work force, however, insisted on using the older nineteenth-century terms
"consumption" or "phthisis" to describe the condition. There was nothing new or
complex about whatwas causing them to cough, wheeze, spit blood, and waste away:
Physicians "have given the old-time consumption a new name," the union observed,
"and talklearnedly about it, butwhat doesthat amount towhen men aredyingin our
midst almost daily ofthis fell disease." Writing that the rate ofdisease should "strike
terror to the heart of every granite cutter," the union declared that the focus of
attention should be on prevention ofthe dusty conditions and control over the speed
ofwork because "the men work at a faster clip than the constitution of any human
machine is able to stand up to" [2].
Despite the fact that the term "silicosis" would not be widely used in the United
States until after 1915, dust had been long recognized as a problem for hard-rock
miners, cutters, potters, buffers, glass workers, sandblasters, and foundry workers
[3]. Since antiquity, observers had recognized that workers developed serious
breathing problems when they inhaled the dust of certain rocks and minerals.
Throughout most ofthe nineteenth century, doctors and laymen alike had accepted
dust as a source of phthisis or, more commonly, consumption, chronic lung condi-
tions that affected broad cross-sections ofwestern European and American society.
For the previous two centuries, this condition was the single greatest cause of death
in Europe and America. Despite the great attention to epidemics of smallpox,
cholera, or typhoid, consumption was "the great white plague" that threatened "the
very survival" of European and American society. The symptoms of wasting away,
482SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISEASE
coughing, spitting, and weakening might appear in victims from various classes and
social strata.
Before the acceptance of the germ theory, practitioners and laymen alike under-
stood disease in highly personal and idiosyncratic terms. Much ofmedical therapeu-
tics rested on the belief that disease was a reflection of individuals' special social,
personal, hereditary, and economic circumstances. People's maladies were based, in
part, on the pecularities of the individual and his or her life. As Charles Rosenberg
has written, "the body was seen, metaphorically, as a system ofdynamic interactions
with its environment. Health or disease resulted from a cumulative interaction
between constitutional endowment and environmental circumstance" [4]. As John
Warner has argued, it was the special relationship between an individual and a
complex, highly particularized environment that was at the root of illness. The
practitioner's therapeutic skills were measured by his or her ability to weigh,
evaluate, and differentiate the patient fromotherswhomight have similarsymptoms.
The diagnosis and treatment of consumption, also commonly called phthisis,
developed within this general medical milieu. Those suffering from the common
symptoms of coughing, wheezing, and spitting blood, all had phthisis. The disease
took on different meanings for different classes and groups in the ever-changing
urban and industrial societies of western Europe and the United States. Physicians
"faced with a confusing array of signs and symptoms, bearing no obvious relation to
one another," saw these signs as "the expression of different maladies." For
middle-class sufferers the disease wasoftenpresented in almost a romanticlight. The
translucent flush of Victorian ladies suffering from this disease became a standard
image in the nineteenth-century novel. For the working class, however, the disease
had a much more threatening aspect: workers and their families huddled together in
the slum dwellings oflarge cities such as London, Paris, and New York [5].
The apparent idiosyncracy of the symptoms that marked phthisis during most of
the first half of the nineteenth century reinforced standard ideas regarding the
nature, course, and treatment of disease. Phthisis could be linked to the ongoing,
long-term moral and social environment that predisposed a victim to a disease
process. Medical practitioners and the public as well shared a common set of
assumptions about the cause and treatment of the disease. Phthisis could be rooted
in personal behavior such as drinking, social position, poor living quarters, malaise of
urban life style, and, finally, indoor, unhealthful work. As Warner notes, "Treatment
was to be sensitively gauged not to a disease entity but to such distinctive features of
the patient as age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic position, and moral status, and
to attributes of place like climate, topography and population density" [6]. A
practitioner needed to have acomplete knowledge ofthe life historyofthe patient in
order to make an accurate diagnosis and plan of treatment.
Researchers had documented the importance of a variety of sources for phthisis.
Among them were the home, crowding, impure air, and dust in the workplace. In
descriptions ofvarious dusty trades, it was commonly pointed out that phthisis and
consumption were causedbythe industry. In anIndustnialHistoryofthe UnitedStates,
published in 1878, the author described the sources of "grinders' consumption" in
the axe industry: because of "the constant inhalation of the grit and bits of steel
thrown offin the process ... a premature death is rarely averted" [7].
Consumption or phthisis was a term used to denote a wide variety of symptoms.
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The disease could be of an acute nature and "prove fatal in a fewweeks." Or itmight
start with acute symptoms and evolve into a chronic condition. Alternatively, its
symptoms might appear slowly, gradually getting worse over many years. Further-
more, it could affect lungs, bones, the brain, and other organs ofthe body.
In the years following Pasteur's work on rabies and yeast, the medical community
began to change its view regarding the multiple sources of illness. Increasingly,
laboratory science began to hold out the possibility that disease could be explained
rationally through the discovery ofspecificmicroorganisms.
The discoveryofthe tuberculosisbacilluswasperhaps the mostdramaticconfirma-
tion of the significance of the concept of the germ. In the years following Koch's
discovery, medical history became a listing of physiological and hereditary factors
that might explain the symptom. "In attempting to arrive at a correct solution ofthe
problem," noted one physician explaining the method of diagnosing tuberculosis in
1904, "the greatest care should always be exercised to ascertain ... carefully all the
facts that can be learned concerning the patient's past history and mode of life."
While in the middle years of the nineteenth century this admonition might have
meant exploring personal behavior, work history, and living conditions, by now it
simply meant examining "the probable duration of the disease, the occurrence of a
foregoing haemoptysis, a history of an attack of typhoid, pneumonia, pleurisy, or
protracted influenza, and, to a certain extent the individual's appearance" [8]. The
effect of this changing medical culture was critical in the study of phthisis [9].
According to Ludwig Teleky, a noted industrial physician and author of the first
history of industrial hygiene, by the year of Koch's discovery there was "a vast
knowledge of[the importanceofl dust on the lungs." But now, suddenly, the studyof
its industrial etiology ceased: "At that time ... the study of the effects of dust
stopped. Allcases [ofphthisis] werediagnosed astuberculosis." Researchers"mocked
at all those 'curiosities' ofquartzlungs, coallungs, and ironlungs, 'all ofwhichbelong
in a cabinet of curiosities than in industrial hygiene'" [10]. All consumption or
phthisis came to be understood as tuberculosis, caused by a specific organism and
spread like other infectious diseases. "Medical science claims that the presence of
the tubercle bacillus in the lungs is the fundamental cause of phthisis, or
consumption," trumpeted a New Yorkerwriting to ScientificAmerican in 1904 [11].
With the revolution inbacteriology that followed the discoveries ofPasteur, Lister,
and Koch in the middle decades ofthe century, however, "Bacteriology thus became
an ideological marker, sharply differentiating the 'old' public health, the province of
untrained amateurs from the 'new' public health, which belonged to scientifically
trained professionals." Despite the different professional mandates ofpublic health
workers and physicians, both groups ofprofessionals began to share a common faith
in the significance of the disease-specific germ entity in creating consumption. The
implications for medical and public health understanding was that the modes of
transmission ofthe bacteria had to be clearly identified and an effective campaign to
eliminate the specific sources of the disease was to be mounted. It seemed that the
oldergeneration's emphasis oncleaningup thegeneral environment wasmisdirected
and inefficient. One of the advocates of the new public health summed up the
revolution in ideology that overtook the field in the 1880s: "Before 1880 we knew
nothing; after 1890 we knew it all; it was aglorious tenyears" [12].
There was almost universal agreement amongmedical andpublic healthpersonnel
about the etiology of phthisis [13]: the bacillus, not dust per se, made people sick.
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Although metallic and mineral dusts might be injurious to workers' lungs, they were
merely a small problem in comparison to the dangers posed by bacterial infection
[14]. One authority stated: "Dusts, . . . though they ought ... to be kept away from
workpeople, as a preventive measure against consumption, are yet only remotely a
cause ofthe disease" [15].
It was not that the new medical and public health viewpoints completely ignored
dust as a factor in the creation ofphthisis. But dust's importance was in its role as a
vehicle that carried the bacillus fromvictim tovictim. One physician summarized the
general understanding of the relationship between dust and tuberculosis by noting
that "inhalation is probably the common mode of infection, and that indirectly
through infected dustwithwhich the air is laden" [16].
Just as the field had developed unanimity and clarity regarding how to define and
explain "true" phthisis, Thomas Oliver and British governmental investigators
published a series of studies that had a major effect on some American reformers,
public health workers, and statisticians. Oliver and others argued that non-infectious
cases of lung disorders were more important than previously assumed. In 1902,
Oliver, in his famous treatise on the Dangerous Trades, noted "the tendency of
modern pathology is to look upon all pulmonaryphthisis or consumption as tubercu-
losis, but the fact remains that phthisis can be caused by dust." He explained that
these pneumoconioses had been neglected but that they were significant for large
cross-sections of the working population. "The affected workman is regarded as the
victim ofconsumption, but the disease is not necessarily tuberculosis," he warned.
By 1906, some British researchers had developed a new theory about phthisis that
challenged the bacteriological model. It was not one disease. Rather, there were
three distinct conditions producing similar symptoms: "pulmonary disease manifests
itself in three kinds or forms-as ordinary tuberculous phthisis, acute or chronic; as
'fibroid phthisis,' and as a mixed formwhen a tuberculous process is ingrafted sooner
or later upon the fibroid" [17]. The British Committee on Compensation for
Industrial Diseases took pains to distinguish between "fibroid phthisis" and the
tuberculosis kind. "The first symptom [of fibroid phthisis] is a cough which insidi-
ously and for a while almost imperceptibly becomes habitual. At first in the morning
only, it graduallybecomes more frequent during the day, and expectoration, nominal
at the beginning, becomes more marked, though not profuse until the latter stages of
the disease."
During the first decade of the twentieth century, most medical and public health
professionals in the United States were still wedded to a bacteriological model that
posited the unity oftuberculosis and phthisis. But others were developingcompeting
models ofthe causes ofsickness. Workers in the dusty trades, isolated from the new
ideology of medicine and public health, continued to see their suffering as rooted in
the terrible conditions ofwork. They still accepted the pre-bacteriological consensus
that phthisis was linked to individual circumstance. Rather than emphasizing per-
sonal morality, susceptibility, or habit, however, they emphasized social factors such
as work and living conditions. The explosion ofjob actions, labor unrest, and strikes
at the turn ofthe century cannot be understood without looking into the disintegra-
tion of the work environment and concurrent increase in accidents and disease that
paralleled the intensification ofwork and the introduction ofpower tools inthe dusty
trades. Miners suffering from constricted breathing called their disease alternately
miners' phthisis or miners' consumption; potters called their affliction potters'
485ROSNER AND MARKOWITZ
consumption or phthisis; other workers identified their symptoms as grinders' rot,
glassblowers' con, granite cutters' phthisis, and so on. There was no attention to the
bacteria in thedescriptionsoftheirconditions,buttherewas agreat dealofattention
to the specific industry that caused the sickness. Even industry spokespeople
accepted the industrial origins of workers' complaints. They continued to use the
terms phthisis, consumption, and tuberculosis interchangeably, with little regard to
the differentiation between bacterial and non-bacterial lung disorders. TheIronAge,
a tradejournal, pronounced "Miners' phthisis is sogreat an evil" that itwas essential
to deal effectivelywith "this most terrible form oftuberculosis" [18].
Thebacteriological consensus was also underminedby a diverse group ofProgres-
sive-era reformers who were developing a broader conception of the origins of
phthisis. For reformers concerned with the plight of the urban poor, the effect of
tuberculosis was obvious and profound and could not be divorced from the terrible
conditions of life and work. Charity and settlement house workers, for example,
documented that nearly one out of every four dwellings in New York City in 1890
experienced a death fromphthisis. In the poorerneighborhoods, itwas clear, the toll
was much higher, leaving these communities devastated by the disease [19]. For
these reformers, phthisis was a disease of poverty, not ofgerms. One of the leading
social welfare reformers ofthe time, Graham Taylor, declared that tuberculosis was
a "disease of the working classes" and that "everything which makes the life of the
workingman harder, everything which is attendant upon poverty, makes for the
increase of this disease" [20]. The interplay of "Housing, playgrounds, diet, in-
come, ... physical education, and immigration" and even dental hygiene "appear to
beverydiverse ifnotincongruoustopics." But,when "grouped about the central idea
ofpromoting immunity their interdependence becomes obvious" [21].
The social reform analysis that intimately linked social conditions and disease
creation led settlement house workers and labor leaders to emphasize the connec-
tion between work and tuberculosis [22]. "Where there is dirt and grime and dust,
longhours, foul air and bad pay, the community pays forwhat it calls cheap prices by
a little money and many lives sacrificed to greed, ignorance and indifference," said a
representative of labor in 1906. Labor called for factory inspection, good wages,
"fresh air into our shops," and other factory legislation to address the problem of
workers' health [23]. Graham Taylor saw four "characteristics of employment" that
put workers at risk: "insanitary conditions," "low rate of wages," "fatigue," and
"long and irregular hours." Under the heading of insanitary conditions, Taylor
identified two major sub-categories, "hygienic surroundings which are not inherent
in the trade itself and those conditions which are to a certain extent necessitated by
the character of the trade." Among the latter, he wrote that "the dust producing
trades each lead as producers of tuberculosis and especially those in which the
dust-particles are very irritating." Taylor identified stonecutters, grinders, cigar
workers, lead and copper miners, and others as at risk. Furthermore, he noted that
these workers were usually "strong well-developed men," but they suffered from
enormous death rates from tuberculosis [24]. In the hands ofreformers in and out of
government, statistics and data collection became powerful tools for education,
analysis, and agitation [25].
This social analysis had an influence on the world view of an elite group of
statisticians and social planners. FrederickHoffman, the statistician for The Pruden-
tial Life Insurance Company, and Louis Dublin, his counterpart at Metropolitan
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Life, were especially receptive because it helped to explain morbidity and mortality
data on the industrial work force that these insurance giants were accumulating. In
the late 1800s, these two companieswere the largest and most important commercial
insurers ofworking-class Americans. They pioneered in the provision of "industrial
insurance," which provided minimal life and burial insurance for laborers. Unlike
common life insurance, industrial insurance depended on an extensive network of
agentswho, on aweeklybasis,wouldvisitworkers' homes to collect premiums offive
and ten cents per family member. By 1910, industrial insurance was a three billion
dollarbusiness, with Metropolitan Life and The Prudential handling over 80 percent
of all premiums. In that same year, more than 23 million Americans held industrial
policies, with more than 19 million covered by these two companies [26].
Because these two insurance giants' success depended on the changing mortality
picture among the various industries and population groups, their statisticians
gathered enormous amounts ofdatadocumenting disease, disability, and death rates
among every conceivable industrial population. They developed actuarial charts for
blacks, whites, Indians, women, men, children; miners, steelworkers, bakers, quarry
workers, white-collarworkers, and wage earners in scores ofother industries. At the
turn of the century, state and federal labor and health departments were just
beginning to assume a major role in gathering statistics on the health of the work
force. Thus, statisticians, such as Hoffman at The Prudential and Lee Frankl and
Louis Dublin at Metropolitan, undertook investigations of their own which became
thebasis for many state and federal reports [27].
Unlike the new public health epidemiologists who focused their attention on the
diseased as a source of infection, Hoffman sought to understand disease as a
reflection of community structure and organization. For example, Frederick Hoff-
man found it necessary to take extended tours of the communities in which The
Prudential had extensive interests in order to document the industrial, home, and
communityfactors that affected mortality and morbidity rates. In towns all along the
way he would conduct what we would today recognize as detailed epidemiological
and ecological studies of the relationship between health and community develop-
ment. He would arrive in a community in the afternoon and begin developing a
detailed profile of that town's health experience. Sometimes he would begin by
heading directly to the cemetery, where he would spend several hours noting the
dates ofbirth and death from the tombstones. In his hotel in the evening, he would
develop a detailed actuarial chart on the age-specific mortality of different popula-
tions over time. Hewould spend the next dayvisiting the local mine, mill, orsmelter.
He would travel into the shaft of a mine, chronicling the safety and health risks
associated with every phase ofproduction. He talked to companyofficials, gathering
data about the number of accidents, the incidence ofsickness including pneumonia,
tuberculosis, and lead poisoning. He would follow up on this data gathering by
visitinglocal physicians, coroners, funeral homes, and the local library to corroborate
the picture that he heretofore had developed. If The Prudential already insured
workers in thatcommunity, hewould compare this informationwith data that he had
gathered through his own claims department. Ifthe company had notyet moved into
the town, he would make a recommendation to the President whether to move into
the community and, ifso, which groups ofworkers to insure [28].
Hoffinan helped to unmask silicosis as a distinct condition in the United States.
His reading of the European literature had convinced him that the interests of the
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insurance industry were diverging from those of the medical and public health
professionals. In his study, The Mortalityfrom Consumption in Dusty Trades (1908),
Hoffman pointed out that "human health was much influenced by the character of
the air breathed and that its purity [was] a matter ofvery considerable sanitary and
economic importance" [29]. He directly contradicted the prevalent assumption
among clinicians who saw tuberculosis and other infectious diseases as the primary
threat to the average workman. "The sanitary dangers of air contaminated by
disease-breeding germs are probably not so serious as generallyassumed," hebegan.
Rather, "the destructive effects of the dust-laden atmosphere of factories and
workshops are a decidedly serious menace to health and life." He maintained that
there was actually a "paucity of bacteria in very dusty air." But that "dust in any
form, when inhaled continuously and in considerable quantities, is prejudicial to
health because of its inherent mechanical properties, destructive to the delicate
membrane of the respiratory passages and the lungs." And "I doubt if these bacilli
actually develop phthisis unless there be some antecedent change in the vitality of
the affected tissue.... In otherwords, I look upon a phthisical lung as oneprepared
for the germination and multiplication ofbacilli [bydust], and not a primaryproduct
of those microscopic organisms. . ." [30].
Hoffinan's 1908 study was significant in that it built on the evidence presented in
the British material and the progressive social analysis as developed by the reform-
ers. What was new was his use of statistical materials to challenge the clinical
viewpoint ofthe medical and public health professions. Indoing so, he wasproviding
a new tool that gave legitimacy to the popularview that dust wasdangerous to health.
The statisticians' methods were used to link industrial dust and tuberculosis.
Hoffman noted that "in the group ofoccupationsexposingchiefly to the inhalation of
metallic dust" the mortality from consumption was over a third greater than overall
mortality among industrialworkers. Hisdetailed, age-specific analysis ofthe mortal-
ity data led him to conclude that different types ofdust created different patterns of
mortality from consumption. "Dust from any hard stone (such as flint, granite,
sandstone, etc.) is undoubtedly very injurious to the lungs, producing a marked
predisposition to phthisis." He noted, however, that other dusts produced in coal
mines and cement factories did not have the same effect on the workforce.
While Hoffman in his 1908 report was documenting thecomplexityofthe problem
of the relationship between phthisis and dust, his analysis reached only a portion of
the medical and public health community. Phthisis was still synonymous with
tuberculosis as far as the bulk of the medical profession in the United States was
concerned. While European and British investigators had largely accepted this
changed conception, clinicians and pathologists in the United States largely ignored
the new data. Concerned primarily with the pervasive effect of tuberculosis among
individual patients andworkingwith a heterogeneous clientele from diverse occupa-
tions and backgrounds, doctors saw little significance in this new model of lung
disease. Within such important medical journals as the Journal of the American
MedicalAssociation, The Boston Medical and SurgicalJournal, and The Pennsylvania
Medical Journal there was barely a mention of the new paradigm arising from
Hoffmnan's and the British literature.
Even thepublichealthprofession, which had agreaterfamiliaritywithpopulation-
based statistics, was slow to understand the significance of the data emerging from
the statisticians. In the early years of the century, the profession was isolated from
488SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISEASE
the social turmoil created by the new industrial conditions. Unlike the insurance
industry or the social reformers whose interests and activities forced them to
confront the effect ofindustrialization on the life oftheworkforce, the public health
profession was still primarily concerned with the problems of infectious disease
among populations in the urban centers and ports. There was little attention to the
problems of the industrial worker at the work site and no attention to dust diseases
which were non-infectious. Industrial hygiene was not even a recognized field.
Campaigns against "phossyjaw" and for safety in factories and mines were carried
out by labor unions, muckrakers, social welfare reformers, and settlement workers
rather than by medical and public health professionals. Furthermore, factory inspec-
tions were the province oflabor departments. In an article published in the popular
weekly The Outlook, one author described the "work that kills," noting particularly
that census reports should specify the occupations that expose "the worker to the
constant inhalation of irritating dust" [31]. In Illinois, the State Factory Inspector
pointed to the deleterious effects of dust on workers in metal polishing, buffing, and
grinding, and, in New York State, the Factory Investigating Commission that was
organized followingthe Triangle Shirtwaist fire held hearings on the dust conditions
in a number ofupstate industrial concerns [32].
While individuals in the public health movement such as C.-E.A. Winslow and
Alice Hamilton participated in these larger movements, it was not viewed as an
intrinsic part of the mandate ofpublic health [33]. Only in the second decade ofthe
twentieth century, well after Hoffman's first study had been published, the public
health profession took official notice of industrial hygiene and even then rarely
incorporated factory conditions into its campaigns to control tuberculosis and other
infectious diseases among the industrial work force [34]. As late as 1922, Hoffman
complained that there was too much emphasis on the sanatoria treatment of
tuberculosis and too little on prevention. He noted that ofthe numerous recommen-
dations of the committee on tuberculosis policy of the Conference of State and
Provincial Boards of Health in 1919, "there is not a single reference to the dust
problem.... Until the industrial aspects of the disease, and particularly the dust
question, are more clearly realized, there is little hope of a reduction oftuberculosis
frequency among industrial workers" [35]. Hoffman, the statistician, challenged the
prevalent assumptions of the new public health worker who maintained that "to
control tuberculosis, it was not necessary to improve the living conditions ofthe one
hundred million people in the United States, only to prevent the 200,000 active
tuberculosis cases from infecting others" [36].
In 1915, the public health profession slowly began to accept interpretations
promotedby the statisticians andreformers. Itwas in thatyearthat the United States
Public Health Service was first granted authority to investigate "occupational
diseases and the relation of occupations to disease" and organized a Section of
Industrial Hygiene and Sanitation. Shortly thereafter, the American Public Health
Association formed its own section of Industrial Hygiene [37]. By the end of the
Progressive era, officers in the United States Public Health Service were increasingly
struck by the importance of the workplace, in addition to the home, as a major
predisposing factor affecting workers' health. In a major study of health insurance
conducted by two senior United States Public Health Service officials, B.S. Warren
and Edgar Sydenstricker, the Service concluded that "there is no longer any doubt
that modern industry is responsible for a considerable proportion ofworkingmen's
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physical ills" [38]. A few of the state departments of health took an active and
sustained interest in occupational diseases, most notably Ohio, under the leadership
of Emery R. Hayhurst. In a massive study ofindustrial hygiene in Ohio, published in
1915, Hayhurst pointed to the problem of dust in producing pneumoconioses,
independent of tuberculosis. Citing the dangers of iron dust, coal dust, cotton dust,
and silica dust, Hayhurst drew on Hoffman and Oliver to conclude that these dusts
produced a fibrosis which result "in the end, in a condition calledphthisis, which is
usually complicated by the presence ofthe bacillus tuberculosis" [39].
Throughout the early decades ofthe century, the desire to differentiate tuberculo-
sis from fibroid phthisis was frustrated by the problems associated with new medical
technologies, for theyoftenprovidedcompromised information to interested investi-
gators. Bythe early 1900s, the invention ofthe X-raycombinedwiththe development
of the tuberculin test and bacterial analysis of sputum could be used as evidence to
distinguish between infectious and fibroid forms of phthisis. Over the course of the
first twodecades, thetuberculintestwasgraduallyintroduced as atoolfordistinguish-
ing those exposed to the bacillus and those not. Even with the improvements in
technology, however, differential diagnosis ofthese lung conditions was fraught with
uncertainty. X-ray readings were an inexact science at best. As late as 1941,
textbooks noted the difficulty in distinguishing silicosis from tuberculosis by use of
X-rays, even in conjunction with other diagnostic tools. "If there have been no
previous films of the patient's chest," remarked Holmes and Ruggles in their
standard text, Roentgen Interpretation, "it maybe very difficult, after a frank tubercu-
losis with cavitation has developed in such an individual, to determine how much of
the picture is fibrous tuberculosis and how much is a preexisting silicosis" [40].
Others noted the "difficulties ofdiagnosing tuberculosis in the presence ofsilicosis"
and that "the incidence of tuberculosis appears to vary considerably depending on
methods used by different investigators" [41]. Furthermore, the extraordinary expo-
sure of the general population to tuberculosis made the tuberculin test little more
than a confirmation of an individual's presence in a society plagued by tuberculosis
[42].
The acceptance of a distinction between silicosis and tuberculosis was established
in the United States in spite of the weaknesses of the new technologies. The
European and South African studies, together with the statistical materials about
mortality ofmetal miners in the United States, aroused so much concern that in 1911
the United States Public Health Service and the Bureau of Mines initiated an
investigation of the lung diseases of metal miners. This effort resulted in the
identification of silicosis as a major health hazard for metal miners and other
industrialworkers.
In 1914, two federal agencies, the United States Public Health Service and the
Bureau of Mines, initiated the first detailed community study of the disease that
would prove to be a landmark in the discovery of chronic industrial disease.
Conducted by A.J. Lanza, who would become a major figure in industrial hygiene in
the years to come, the study focused on the Tri-State lead and zinc mining region of
Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma. Although public healthworkers had accepted that
heavy metal poisoning could produce chronic diseases, the significance of Lanza's
study was his documentation that symptoms from toxic exposures could and did
occur years and sometimes decades afterward. This extremely long period between
exposure and disease added awhole new dimension to the understanding ofchronic
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disease in general and industrial lung disease in particular. Coming during the heady
periodwhen research scientists had accepted the primacyofbacteriological agents as
the cause of disease, this new perspective brought into question many of the
assumptions that then governed medical science. The accepted methodology relied
on laboratory procedures to discover the germ or specific agent that created disease
symptoms. But Lanza relied on a constellation ofindirect indicators that substituted
for the seeming precision of the laboratory. To diagnose silicosis or other occupa-
tional lung diseases, he depended upon the testimony of the worker that he or she
had been employed in a dusty trade and used X-rays and evidence of shortness of
breath. Unless a patient died and an autopsy was performed, it was impossible to
developthe direct evidence that thebacteriological revolution had trained physicians
to depend upon for a diagnosis.
It is not surprising that Lanza began his study by documenting the extraordinarily
high rates of tuberculosis among miners and their families [43]. In Jasper County,
Missouri, the death rate from this disease was over 20 per 10,000 residents in 1912,
substantially higher than anywhere else in the state. But, at the same time, he showed
that there was also a high incidence of non-tubercular lung disease that he initially
called "miners' consumption." He drew on Hoffman's work to point out: "It is
possible for a miner to have his lungs injuredby rockdust, producing a condition that
is not tuberculosis." Its symptomswere thickened and inelasticlung tissue, which led
to shortness of breath, constant cough, lessened working ability, and loss ofweight.
He noted the close relationship between miners' con and tuberculosis and remarked
on the role that tuberculosis played in accelerating the death of workers with "the
con" [44].
The study exposed the horrendous toll of non-tubercular lung diseases [45]. The
report noted that, ofthe approximately9,000workers employed in the area, about 30
percent had some form of silicosis. Furthermore, it defined three stages to the
disease, with the first being characterized by "slight or moderate dyspnea [shortness
of breath] on exertion" and the third marked by total or very severe disability. It
graphically described the suffering that many of the miners experienced as the
disease progressed: "If we can imagine a man with his chest bound with transparent
adhesive plaster, we can form a mental picture of how useless were the efforts at
deep inhalation made by these patients" [46].
Lanza examined 720 miners. Of these, 120 were diagnosed as having first-stage
silicosis. Their average age was only 31 years, and they had been employed in the
mines only 3'/2 to 41/2 years on average. The Service investigators found another 142
men suffering from stage 2 silicosis; thisgroup had averaged 11.6years on thejob and
were, on the average, 32.7 years old. The group in the third and most serious stage
numbered 68, and their average age was 37.8 years; they had been working, on
average, 15.9 years as miners [47]. The Report concluded that "five years' steady
work with exposure to flint dust is fairly certain to find the miner in at least the first
stage of silicosis" [48]. The study also included a house-to-house survey to obtain
information on minerswho had already died. It concluded that "9.6years ... maybe
taken as the average expectancy of life in a minerwith silicosis, dating from the time
he commenced hard-rock mining" [49]. The Report summarized the horrible condi-
tions of work and life in an area that later would be called "a virtual hellhole" [50].
Not only were workers suffering from silicosis, but they and their families had
extraordinarily high rates oftuberculosis due to the wretchedworkingconditions. Of
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the sample of 720 miners, the Service found that over 100 had silicosis and
tuberculosis, and 39 had uncomplicated tuberculosis.
Statistics once again proved a valuable tool in unmasking the true nature of
silicosis. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the death rate from consump-
tion fluctuated between 30 and 40 per 10,000 population. In Massachusetts, at the
end ofthe Civil War, consumption accountedfor35 deathsfor every 10,000people in
the state. Beginning in the mid-1880s, the death rate from consumption began to
decline rapidly-by the beginning of the twentieth century, only 18.5 deaths from
consumption for every 10,000 people [51]. In the country generally, the death rate
also declined, from 19.5 per 10,000 in 1900 to 9.7 in 1921 [52]. In Barre, Vermont,
however, the death rate from pulmonary tuberculosis was, as late as 1919, over 23.3
per 10,000persons, comparedwith 9 per 10,000forthe restofthe state, andgoingup,
despite the relatively healthful livingconditions ofthe granite workers [53]. Between
1896 and 1918, granite cutters saw the rate oftuberculosis rise from 25.7 per 10,000
to 95.3 per 10,000 despite a decline among the general population, for the same
period, from 20.7 to 9.6 per 10,000. In spite of nearly identical rates in 1896, the
granite cutters' rate rose 400 percent, while the general population's declined more
than 50 percent.
Hoff-man's and Lanza'suncoveringofthe intricaterelationshipbetweentuberculo-
sis and silicosis illustrates the interaction of social movements and professional
analysis. It was the long history of changing work conditions and labor unrest that
brought Hoffman to the area in the first place and alerted him to the influence of
changingwork processes on the health ofthework force [54].
One important case is thegraniteindustry. Inthefirst twodecadesofthe twentieth
century, steam-driven equipment replaced hand drills and sledgehammers in granite
quarries throughout the nation. These quarries produced the large blocks ofgranite
that would be chipped, carved, and crafted into the ornamental stone used for
building facades, monuments and gravestones, columns, mantelpieces, doorsteps,
and hearthstones. From deep cavernous pits in the earth's surface, men would cut
giant blocks of stone that would be hoisted, loaded, and transported to the carving
sheds where the craftsmen and operatives would cut, shape, and engrave the stone.
In these sheds, powertoolswere introduced inthelate nineteenth century, leading to
increased production, speed-ups, dust, and disease. In the first decade of the
twentieth century, the Granite CuttersJournal, the publication ofthegraniteworkers'
union, contained numerous articles about the "stone cutters' consumption," closely
linking its increase to the recent introduction of power tools and the continuing
problem of poor ventilation in the sheds. Unlike prevalent medical opinion in the
early years of the century that emphasized the bacterial origins ofconsumption, for
granite cutters, it was the dust in the sheds where the granite was cut that was at the
root ofthe scourge. In July 1905, an article "About The Dust Question" stressed the
importance ofbetter ventilation in the sheds. Toward the end of the first decade, it
was apparent to the work force that "granite cutters' consumption" was a serious
threat to the health of all workers in the sheds. During the course of the next year,
the workers of the area had decided that conditions in the sheds were reason for
action. During the summer, when the sheds were open, the use of the pneumatic
tools that had been introduced over the course ofthe past decade was tolerable. But
during the winter months, when the windows were closed in the sheds in order to
conserve heat, dust was everywhere. The workers in Northfield, a granite center
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about ten miles from Barre, voted in November 1909 that they would not use the
pneumatic tools until the warmer weather, May 1, 1910, when the sheds would be
opened up and ventilated. In response, the owners fired and locked out the workers,
leading to a much wider job action in the granite sheds throughout the Barre area
[55]. The specific demand of the workers was that use of pneumatic tools be
eliminated during the winter months and that efforts be made to keep the shed free
of dust at all times [56]. An agreement reached in February provided for an
immediate pay increase and for the pneumatic tools not to be used until April 1.
Employers had until June 1 to install dust removal equipment or the tool was to be
permanently retired. Just before the June first deadline, the Barre granite cutters
wrote to the national union that "it will be good-bye to the notorious trouble-making
disease-breeding, hand surfacer tomorrow, unless properly equipped with suction
fan or other device to remove the dust.... The hand surfacer is only a man killer at
best, and the scrap heap where many of them will be consigned to is a fitting end for
all such inventions" [57].
The strike over pneumatic tools was part of a much larger struggle over control of
the work process, not only in the granite trade but also in a host of other industries
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the Progressive era,
popular perception of the deleterious effect of changing production processes in a
host of industries reinforced epidemiological studies. In a discussion of the axe
industry, one commentator described the decreasing time it took different nationali-
ties to recognize its health hazards. "When I came here 40 years ago [1880] I found
the victims among the Yankees who had ground some 20 years before. Those could
grind 18 or 20 years before having to give it up. The French-Canadians were then
grinding. They could work 12 to 16 years. They became frightened off and the Swedes
took up the work. They would get the disease in 8 or 10 years. Now the Finns and
Polanders are at it, and they last only 3 to 5 years, and the disease is more common
among them." In the foundry and metal-mining industries, this general conflict over
routines, pace, and technological innovation that has been described so elegantly by
David Montgomery and others was fought out around health and disease [58].
The significance of the granite cutters' objections to pneumatic tools as a source of
disease and the resultant labor strife surrounding workplace control did not escape
investigators. Frederick Hoffman helped organize a study for the United States
Department ofLabor Working Conditions Service on the prevalence of tuberculosis
and silicosis, and his preliminary report began with an acknowledgment of the
importance of labor in bringing the issue to his attention by quoting from a letter
from Mr. Walter W. Drayer, General Secretary and Treasurer of the Journeymen
Stone Cutters' Association ofNorth America. In his letter, Drayer noted that, during
the second decade of the twentieth century, there had been an "almost universal
installation" of the air-hammer in the limestone and granite industries. He went on
to detail the devastating effects ofthe use ofthis new technology on the health of the
workers: "The use of the pneumatic hammer subjects our members to more danger
in the contracting of tuberculosis than do the tools of our trade-the mallet and
hammer-in as much as the vibration or stroke of this hammer is constant, thus
emitting a steady stream of this fine dust into the face and nostrils of the operator,
while with the tools of the trade there was, of course, an interval between the blows
which gave the dust some opportunity ofbeing carried away in the air" [59]. Hoffman
agreed with their assessment about the effect of the introduction of high-speed drills
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on the health of stonecutters. In 1919, while preparing to join in this health
investigation of the quarry workers in Barre, Vermont, Alice Hamilton wrote that
"There is an interesting dust problem out here [in Barrel, so confused with labor
difficulties that it is impossible to obtain any impartial information on it" [60].
Hamilton and Hoffman took issue with the public health community's perspective,
which emphasized poor living conditions as a necessary precondition for tuberculo-
sis, by noting that the granite cutters had among the best living conditions and
physical appearance of all industrial workers. Hoffman remarked that they lived
"under sanitary conditions above the average" and that their "housing conditions ...
are also above the average" of most workers, "so that the possibly unfavorable
environmental factors are of decidedly secondary importance." Furthermore, the
workers had "asuperiorphysique, indicativeofa higherdegreeofdisease resistance."
How then explain their devastating healthexperience, especiallythe excessive deaths
due to tuberculosis? Given the favorable general living conditions ofthe work force,
one should expect improved longevity and lowered tuberculosis rates. Hoffman
believed that disease was proportionate to the length of time workers were exposed
to silica on the job rather than to their exposure to germs at home.
By the mid-1920s, few doubted Hoffman's conclusion that silicosis in and of itself
was the primary problem affecting the workers of Barre, Vermont. Numerous
investigators from the Public Health Service, Vermont Department of Health,
Vermont Industrial Hygiene Division, and the union began exhaustive studies
documenting the prevalence of this disease [61]. The Public Health Service and
others would continue studying the occurrence of silicosis amonggranite workers for
decades to come [62], but effective reform of working conditions would not be
initiated until the late 1930s, after a series ofcrises had affected not only the granite
industry, but the nation's foundry workers, metal miners, potters, glassblowers, and
metal grinders as well.
In the 1920s, a new field emerged that integrated several different traditions and
perspectives. Industrial hygiene in the 1920s assumed a varied character that
reflected the various traditions from which it arose during the Progressive era.
Industrial hygienists counted among their number public health and urban reform-
ers, the new medical and public health bench scientists and professionals, and,
finally, physicians, engineers, and otherpersonnelemployed byindustry. The reform-
ers emphasized working conditions, wages, and hours in their fight for better health.
The newer generation of industrial hygienists were primarily physicians whose
training led them to see industrial disease in much narrower terms. This group
emphasized personal hygiene, the laboratory, and identification of specific toxins or
germs in their attempt to improve workers' health. The third group, drawn from the
ranks of the company doctor, industrial engineers, and newly emerging industrial
welfare departments, also tended to emphasize individual responsibility and suscep-
tibility rather than corporate or societal factors in their analysis.
By the 1920s, silicosis was established as an important industrial diseases [63]. No
longer merely an idiosyncratic industrial dust disease in a "cabinet ofcuriosities," it
clearly affected important American industries. But silicosis was perceived as a
problem affecting rural, relatively isolated populations inwidely scattered communi-
ties in the non-industrial states. Joplin, Missouri, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, Barre,
Vermont, or even Quincy, Massachusetts, were not likely to gain national attention
because their populations were being devastated by an obscure disease. One
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indication of the lack of political concern about the disease was that none of the
workers' compensation legislation passed between 1911 and 1925 included silicosis
as a compensable condition. Silicosis had been created as a disease category but was
not yet understood to be a national health problem. It would take a crisis in an
industry critical to the national economy to make this a condition capable of
capturing the attention ofthe vast majority ofpractitioners or the imagination ofthe
American public. And that would have to await the social and economic crisis that
would affect workers, management, public health and medical professionals alike
during the Depression ofthe 1930s.
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